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Abstract 
In this study, we try to discover the variables susceptible to affect the peace. To arrive 
there, we made resort to the analysis in cross-sectional. We find that the institutional 
variables are auspicious to the peace, especially the political stability. The 
macroeconomic variables are, on the whole, of the positive and statistically 
meaningful determinants to the peace, in spite of the fact that some are not robust. 
The war remains damaging to the peace and this in a robust manner. It is more or less 
the same report for the inequalities. The effects of the size of nation, the religion and 
the diversity are not as clear. The human capital seems favorable. 
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1 Introduction 
According to theoretical predictions, empirical (Gleditsch et al. 2002, Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2004; Hegre et al., 2002; Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom, 2004, World Bank 
2003), it is far from end wars. Unfortunately we tend also to a kind of concentration these, 
especially in poor countries. The probability of its occurring is high in pats Border 
(Martin et al., 2008). In addition, we were able to discover the one hand they were due to 
reasons as diverse and varied (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002; Fearon, 2005, Fearon and 
Laitin, 2003; Hegre et al., 2001, Reynal-Querol, 2002, Collier and Hoeffler, 2002) and 
secondly they have consequences (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002) both short (Collier, 1999; 
Sambanis, 2003; Brück, 2001, Colletta and Cullen, 2000; Hoeffler and Reynal -Querol, 
2003, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2002; Guha-Sapir and Van Panhuis, 2003; Ghobarah, 
Huth and Russer, 2003) and long term (Collier, Hoeffler and Pattillo, 2002, World Bank 
2003; Doyle and Sambanis 2003; Sambanis, 2000). Another bad news: they tend to last 
long, especially civil wars on average (Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom, 2004 Balch-
Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Buhaug, Gates and Lujala, 2002, DeRouen, 2003, Elbadawi 
and Sambanis, 2000, Fearon 2002). 
It becomes clear that the war economy presents us with a little perspective streaming for 
poor countries. It is therefore essential to mobilize to find peace, because it is important, 
even for development. Precisely, this study's objective is to identify potential variables 
that explain the peace. We answer the question what are the determinants of peace. In 
answering these questions, it will be understood, we reverse the movement that is 
preferred by far the economics of war. If you can afford it is directly in the economy of 
peace, as Wagner (1993), Hartzell et al. (2001). 
Apart from this introduction, this work opens with the presentation of the flag of peace. 
The third section presents the methodology and data of the study. Then, we present the 
results of our study. Finally, we draw a conclusion. 
2 Peace measure 
We use the indicator of Peace of Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) and developed 
in consultation with an international panel of peace experts from peace institutes and 
think tanks with data collected and collated by the Economist Intelligence Unit. This 
indicator is a composite of several indicators. The table below shows the diferent 
indicators. 
 Source
2
: Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_Peace_Index), à partir des différents rapports de Institute 
for Economics and Peace, Economist Intelligence Unit (2011). (2)  In this case, a conflict is defined as, "a contested 
incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of 
which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year." (3) Excludes 
militia and national guard forces. (4) This includes, "cash outlays of central or federal government to meet the costs 
of national armed forces—including strategic, land, naval, air, command, administration and support forces as well 
as paramilitary forces, customs forces and border guards if these are trained and equipped as a military force."  (5) 
This includes transfers, purchases, or gifts of aircraft, armoured vehicles, artillery, radar systems, missiles, ships, 
engines 
Indicators not already ranked on a 1 to 5 scale were converted by using the following 
formula: x=(x-Min(x))/(Max(x)-Min(x)) where Max(x) and Min(x) are the highest and 
lowest values for that indicator of the countries ranked in the index. The 0 to 1 scores that 
resulted were then converted to the 1 to 5 scale. Individual indicators were then weighted 
according to the research team's judgment of their importance. The scores were then 
tabulated into two weighted sub-indices: internal peace, weighted at 60% of a country's 
final score, and external peace, weighted at 40% of a country's final score 
A low score corresponds to a better situation. 
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 We have checked with the main source. You can find the main source here: 
http://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/PDF/2010/2010%20GPI%20Results%20Report.pdf (21 août 
2012) 
3 Data and method 
The nature of the data used and their sources of origin are included in the appendices for 
convenience. Variables are historical (colonial origin, origin of law and the lagged 
variables to take into account the problems already likely to reverse causality), socio-
cultural (linguistic, ethnic and religious, religion, type of religion), socio and economic 
(inequality, gender), politics (war democracy), demographic (population growth, 
urbanization) and economic (growth, inflation, openness, size of government, etc..). We 
have attempted to make a base as large as necessary. 
We will use essentially any ordinary square (OLS). For all estimates, To adjust for 
heteroskedasticity, I present White-corrected standard errors. We also use instrumental 
variables when we consider some relevant variables that could also be explained by the 
dependent variable. 
4 Results 
Our results are divided into two sub-sections. The first sub-section presents the results 
considering all the regressors as exogenous variables in peace. While in the second sub-
section raises the hypothesis of exogeneity of all regressors. For, indeed, some variables 
may cause the peace can also be cause by peace. In such a circumstance, the OLS 
estimators are not fully effective. 
4.1 Results with exogenous variables year 
At this level also, note that we present the general and specific outcomes. In the specific 
results, we further dissect the findings of a number of potential determinants that we 
present in the overall results. 
General result 
Table 1 shows the results of our initial regressions. In column (1), we have put most of 
our selected determinants. We find that information and develop, inequality, openness and 
terms of trade are significant. The increase in inequality is significantly detrimental to 
peace. But access important information accessible to people easier, more open and 
favorable terms of trade are statistically conducive to peace. A higher life expectancy 
does not appear to be essential for peace, which is not necessarily the case for other 
human capital variable (the average intelligence of a nation). The effect of this second 
variable of human capital remains positive peace in all regressions. Life expectancy has 
the same result as another indicator of human capital in the remains of regressions. These 
two variables are, however, not significant. Greater diversity and more religion in one 
country may be conducive to peace. This is the same conclusion for the macroeconomic 
and institutional variables selected. The size of the state does not have a specific effect. If 
the geographical size and urbanization seem to be favorable, there is little evidence the 
same effect on population growth. No statistically positive gender was found, except for 
column (4). Again, the magnitude of the coefficient is almost zero. War and peace reduce 
murders in a country and significantly. 
But the major weakness of this first regression is to be inserted in the estimation of many 
variables, but observations. What we are trying to correct in columns (2) and (3). We note 
that the pus by the variables that were significant remained. Others are also added, in the 
case of democracy and the size of the state govern picked consumption on GDP. For 
certain variable, we find that the positive effect remains in the first four estimates, but it is 
the instability of the significance that problem. 
What is quite surprising is the sign change of religion. It becomes unfavorable to peace. 
War as inequalities keep the same sign and become more statistically significant. More 
information to affluent population remains essential for peace, but we can not find any 
trace of the material. Variable economic growth becomes favorable to peace in the rest of 
the regressions and significantly. Confidence that the rest was positive peace is no longer. 
This conclusion confidence remains insignificant. 
Column (4) has undergone other changes. The index that we used to measure the 
information and the level of development (number of television per 1000 people) has 
been changed by the number of persons per 1000 newspaper. The index of the opening 
[(Export + Import) / GDP] has been replaced by the index of imports of goods and 
services to GDP. And the index of gender was also changed by the number of women in 
government. After this change we also serves as a robustness check, we find that diversity 
is conducive to peace significantly, inflation and urbanization problems become 
statistically peace. The opening is not as significant in column (1). The previous 
conclusion on social trust remains the same, but this time significantly. 
This shows that only war and inequality remained robust to changes in different 
specifications, but to changes in the sample size. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Main regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EthnoLing -.539 
(.400) 
-.0423 
(.191) 
.018 
(.185) 
-.310** 
(.179) 
Religion -.654 
(.532) 
.372 
(.306) 
.421 
(.340) 
.063 
(.316) 
IQ -.004 
(.026) 
-.009 
(.011) 
-.002 
(.009) 
-.016 
(.010) 
Life expectancy  
 
.023 
(.01) 
-.003 
(.013) 
-.010 
(.010) 
-.008 
(.013) 
Inégalité .031* 
(.013) 
.015** 
(.006) 
.014*** 
(.004) 
.0153*** 
(.005) 
Information and development  -.002** 
( .001) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
Gender .006 
( .008) 
.004 
(.005) 
.006 
(.004) 
-.000 
(.004) 
Guerre .156* 
( .053) 
.165*** 
(.038) 
.144*** 
(.030) 
.167*** 
(.032) 
Revc .994* 
( .399) 
.101 
(.160) 
  
Inflation  -.004 
(.003) 
.002 
(.003) 
.004 
(.002) 
.005*** 
.002 
Open -.010* 
(.003) 
-.002 
(.002) 
-.001 
(.002) 
.000 
(.003) 
Growth rate of terms of trade -13.666* 
(4.418) 
   
Ratio of liquid libialities to GDP -.055 
(.402) 
-.129 
(.237) 
  
Urbanization -.008 
(.009) 
.005 
(.004) 
.004 
(.003) 
.007** 
( .003) 
Growth population .231 
(.185) 
-.045 
(.060) 
-.050 
(.068) 
-.002 
(.065) 
Log Area -.034 
(.037) 
-.041 
(.042) 
-.031 
(.035) 
-.017 
(.027) 
Gov. consumption share of GDP -1.343 
(2.560) 
-1.887 
(1.054) 
-1.568* 
( .864) 
-2.234 
(1.429) 
Economic Growth .006 
(.048) 
-.0465 
(.036) 
-.048* 
(.027) 
-.0967***   
(.032) 
Democracy -.037 
(.038) 
-.0723** 
(.032) 
-.066* 
(.033) 
-.014 
(.024) 
Type of economic organization  -.006 
(.097) 
-.007 
(.066) 
  
Social Infrastructure  2.358 
(.915) 
.489 
(.437) 
  
Trust  -.004 
(.009) 
.001 
(.004) 
.002 
(.004) 
.006* 
(.003) 
Obs 26 47 47 39 
R² 0.99 0.88 0.87 0.92 
Note: The dependent variable is generalized trust. All regressions include a constant term; t-statistics in parentheses 
are based on robust standard errors; ∗∗∗ denotes significance at p < 0.01; ∗∗ at p < 0.05; ∗ at p < 0.10 
Specific result 
In this section, we consider the relationship of peace with a number of variables that we 
considered in Table 1. It is the diversity of religion, war and institutions. 
Diversity and peace 
Tableau 2. Peace and others variables of diversity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ethnicfrac .782*** 
(.217) 
 .467** 
(.188) 
.349 
(.214) 
Languagefrac 
 
.254 
(.234) 
.386** 
(.187) 
 .230 
(.224) 
Religionfrac -.389* 
(.225) 
-.200 
(.182) 
-.129 
(.178) 
-.199 
(.183) 
Demo   -.064*** 
(.015) 
-.062*** 
(.016) 
-.060*** 
(.0159) 
Growth  -.011 
(.018) 
-.006 
(.018) 
-.006 
(.018) 
Trust   -.008*** 
(.002) 
-.007*** 
(.003) 
-.007*** 
(.002) 
Obs 62 61 62 61 
R² 0.30 0.53 0.54 0.56 
Note: The dependent variable is generalized trust. All regressions include a constant term; t-statistics in parentheses 
are based on robust standard errors; ∗∗∗ denotes significance at p < 0.01; ∗∗ at p < 0.05; ∗ at p < 0.10 
In Table 2, we reduced the control variables but mostly we chose to go into the details of 
diversity, considering three different indicators: splitting ethnic, linguistic diversity and 
the diversity of religions. Column (1) of this table, we met these three indicators. Only 
religious diversity has a positive effect on peace. There is more to religion, we would be 
more at peace. This effect is statistically significant. But ethnic diversity seems to be 
inimical to the peace so highly significant. 
In column (2), we assume that ethnic diversity is a perfect substitute for the diversity of 
languages. When we consider this hypothesis, the diversity of languages becomes a 
significant problem for peace. The diversity of religions continues to be conducive to 
peace, but it loses its significance. Columns (3) and (4) lead us to say the same thing. 
Economic growth remains positive peace, as in previous regressions. But its effect may be 
due to chance. Social trust and democracy have signs and are highly signifcatifs positive 
peace. Countries where people move in democracy and trust each other tend to be 
conducive to peace. The same conclusion can be supported under columns (3) and (4). 
Column (3) is the opposite of (2) Diversity in the sense that we readjust our hypothesis we 
consider the diversity of languages is perfect proxy for ethnic diversity. The same 
conclusion in column (2) persists in any point of view. 
In column (4), we assume that the diversity of languages is not necessarily equal to the 
ethnic diversity. And so, we introduce two variables in the regression. We keep the same 
trends, except that the variables are no longer significant diversity. 
Religion and peace 
Table 3. Peace and different religions 
 (1) (2) 
Catholics .002 
(.002) 
-.001 
(.003) 
Orthodox -.000 
(.002) 
-.002 
(.003) 
Muslims .006** 
(.003) 
.003 
(.003) 
Buddhists -.005 
(.005) 
-.012*   
(.006) 
Hindus .009*** 
(.002) 
.006** 
(.003) 
Protestants -.002 
(.002) 
-.007 **   
(.002) 
Jew .068 
(.086) 
.049 
(.077) 
Obs 62 62 
R² 0.24 0.30 
Note: The dependent variable is generalized trust. All regressions include a constant term; t-statistics in parentheses 
are based on robust standard errors; ∗∗∗ denotes significance at p < 0.01; ∗∗ at p < 0.05; ∗ at p < 0.10 
Judaism, Hinduism, Catholicism and Islam have a negative sign for peace. Buddhism and 
Protestantism are favorable in terms of these results. But only Hinduism and Islam have 
statistically significant effects. 
To test the robustness of these results, we change proxies for Islam, Catholicism and 
Protestantism. We report the religion over the population in 1980, as does La Porta et al. 
(1999). Overall, the conclusion bound to the column (1) remains except for Catholicism, 
which is conducive to peace. But the significance of certain variables change. 
Protestantism is significant, as Buddhism. The effect of Islam is no longer statistically 
unfavorable peace. Only the conclusion related to Hinduism persists. It would be inimical 
to the peace, statistically significant. 
War and peace 
Table 3. Robustness check for war 
 (1) (2) (3) 
War  .159*** 
(.057) 
.743*** 
(.157) 
.529*** 
(.095) 
Obs 63 63 48 
R² 0.14 0.22 0.39 
Note: The dependent variable is generalized trust. All regressions include a constant term; t-statistics in parentheses 
are based on robust standard errors; ∗∗∗ denotes significance at p < 0.01; ∗∗ at p < 0.05; ∗ at p < 0.10 
In column (1), we take the same proxy used previously. It is Number of armed conflicts, 
internal and external, in Which the government was Involved, average of years 1995-
2000, as classified by Uppsala Conflict Data Program. In column (2) we will use the sum 
of ratings for Average of Uppsala Conflict Data Program of country is: extrasystemic 
armed conflict, armed conflict interstate, internal armed conflict, and internationalized 
internal armed conflict, for years 1995-2000. Ratings go from 0 (no conflict of this type), 
1 (minor conflict), 2 (intermediate conflict), 3 (war). And in the last column, we use the 
dummy for countries Participated in at least That one external war over the period, 1960-
1985. 
Whatever the proxy used, the same conclusion from Table 1 persists. The little remains 
statistically unfavorable peace. And in the table 3 shows the same magnitude in terms of 
significance. 
Peace and institution 
In this section, we test the relationship peace and institution. In a first step, we will look at 
democracy and just after studying the effect of this meta-institution, we will look at the 
effect of certain dimensions of country institutions on peace. 
Table 4. Democracy and peace 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Democracy -.083***   
(.018) 
-.040***  
(.017) 
      
IQ  -.019***    
(.006) 
 -.028***   
(.008) 
 -.026***   
(.007) 
 -.027***   
(.007) 
Inequality  .009** 
(.005) 
 .008   
(.005) 
 .007   
(.005) 
 .006   
(.005) 
Open   -.004**   
(.002) 
 -.006***   
(.002) 
 -.006***   
(.002) 
 -.005***  
(.002) 
Economc 
Growth 
 -.025   
(.016) 
 -.017   
(.021) 
 -.020   
(.020) 
 -.023   
(.019) 
Polright   .089*** 
(.024) 
.006  
(.025) 
  -.048   
(.059) 
-.077**   
(.038) 
Civillib     .134***   
(.034) 
.036   
(.026) 
.186**   
(.073) 
.117**   
(.047) 
Obs 62 57 59 54 59 54 59 54 
R² 0.36 0.69 0.17 0.65 0.26 0.66 0.27 0.69 
Note: The dependent variable is generalized trust. All regressions include a constant term; t-statistics in parentheses 
are based on robust standard errors; ∗∗∗ denotes significance at p < 0.01; ∗∗ at p < 0.05; ∗ at p < 0.10 
Columns (1) and (2) show the effect of democracy on peace. The conclusion is clear: 
democracy, on the whole, is favorable to peace. Significance is strong. What is quite 
interesting is that the explanatory power of this variable on peace (36%). This is 
significant. In regressions (3) and (4), we consider one dimension of democracy. This is 
the same exercise in (5) and (6). It can be seen in (3) that the variable political rights or 
political freedom is inimical to the peace significantly. Once we control for other 
variables, it is more meaningful but it keeps the same sign. This is the same conclusion 
that emerges for civil liberty. By combining these two dimensions of democracy, we 
realize that civil liberty keeps the same sign and becomes significant. Political freedom, in 
turn, changes sign to become conducive to peace. In column (7), it is not statistically 
significant. However, in column (8), it becomes. What remains relatively intact is the 
explanatory power of these variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Institutions and peace 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Social infrastructure  -1.085***   
(.153)     
-.398*   
(.217) 
      
ICRG   -1.418***   
(.158) 
-.498**   
(.215) 
    
Polstab     -.424***   
(.061) 
-.373***   
(.071) 
  
Goveff       -.350***   
(.038) 
-.181***  
(.050) 
Economic Growth   -.021   
(.021) 
 -.018   
(.022) 
 -.018   
(.016) 
 -.009   
(.015) 
IQ  -.021***    
(.007) 
 -.023 *** 
(.007) 
 -.007   
.007 
 -.018***  
(.006) 
Inequality   .006   
(.005) 
 .005   
(.006) 
 .005   
(.004) 
 .005   
(.005) 
Open   -.005**   
(.002) 
 -.004**  
(.002) 
 -.002   
(.001) 
 -.005***  
(.002) 
Obs 59 54 50 47 62 57 62 57 
R² 0.42 0.67 0.48 0.67 0.68 0.81 0.52 0.70 
Note: The dependent variable is generalized trust. All regressions include a constant term; t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors; ∗∗∗ 
denotes significance at p < 0.01; ∗∗ at p < 0.05; ∗ at p < 0.10 
 
In regressions (1) and (2) of Table 5, it emerges clearly that our indicator of the quality of 
institutions is significant. Best institutions are conducive to peace. To be sure actually, we 
change the proxy institutional variable in (3) and (4) of the same table. Again, the same 
conclusion emerges: the explanatory power of the variable of interest, the magnitude of 
the coefficient and the direction of the effect remains the same. 
In the remaining regressions, we in detail certain aspects of institutions. It is mainly 
political stability (Postab) and Government Effectiveness (Goveff). The first observation 
that emerges is the explanatory power of these variables. They can explain, alone, more 
than 50% of the variation of peace within a country. This is significant. The second 
observation is the importance of the significance of these variables. They are highly 
significant, as evidenced by their p-value. Finally, they are conducive to peace. That a 
country with political stability will tend to be at peace. More it improves, the more peace 
and intensifies in a country. This is the same conclusion for government efficiency. 
Governments may therefore promote peace when they are effective. 
Moreover, it is a problem of endogeneity of these institutional variables in Table 5, 
mainly. Countries can easily have peace political stability, effective government 
institutions or short best qualities. The following sub-section will consider this problem. 
4.2 Results with variables endogenous year 
In Table 6, we instrument only institutional variables. There, reading this table, all the 
institutional variables are considered conducive to peace. However, they are no longer 
statistically significant, except for political stability. Indeed, this variable passes all the 
tests of robustness. It is the variable that stands out from all the others.    
 
 
 
 
Table6. Institutions and peace (with endogenous variables) 
 (1) 
2SLS 
(2) 
2SLS 
(3) 
2SLS 
(4) 
2SLS 
(5) 
2SLS 
Trust -.001   
(.007) 
    
Social 
infrastructure  
 -.127 
(.378) 
   
ICRG   -.298 
(.667) 
  
Polstab    -.456**   
(.172) 
 
Goveff     -.110 
(.121) 
Economic 
Growth  
-.045*   
(.025) 
-.042*   
(.023) 
-.036 
(.023) 
-.039**   
(.015) 
-.035 
(.023) 
IQ -.020***   
(.007) 
-.0178**   
(.007) 
-.023***   
(.007) 
-.008    
(.006) 
-.018***   
(.006) 
Inequality  .005 
(.005) 
.005 
(.004) 
.003 
(.005) 
.0062**   
(.003) 
.005 
( .004) 
Open  -.005**   
(.002) 
-.005**   
(.002) 
-.004*   
(.002) 
-.000   
(.002) 
-.005**  
(.002) 
Religion  .429 
(.308) 
.458 
(.285) 
.274 
(.469) 
-.235 
(.325) 
.232 
(.373) 
Obs 54 49 43 50 50 
R² 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.85 0.73 
Tust instrumented as postcommunist monarchy No Pronoun drop, Minimum temperature (Bjørnskov, 2010, 
2011, 2012). Social infrastructure, ICRG, PolStab and GovEff instrumented leg_british leg_scandivanian 
leg_socialist leg_french, Britcol, Frencol, Spancol, Othercol  and Noncol. leg_german dropped due to collinearity. 
Note: The dependent variable is generalized trust. All regressions include a constant term; t-statistics in parentheses 
are based on robust standard errors; ∗∗∗ denotes significance at p < 0.01; ∗∗ at p < 0.05; ∗ at p < 0.10 
5 Conclusion 
This study had for objective to determine what are the variables that affect the peace to 
the level of the countries. We kept, for that to make, a potential variable multitude. And 
we using the cross-sectional analysis. 
Our findings present themselves as follows: the institutional variables are, on the whole, 
auspicious to the peace. And of all these variables, the one that is different more, it is the 
political stability. The steadiest politically countries tend to have more peace. The 
macroeconomic variables are, on the whole, of the positive and statistically meaningful 
determinants to the peace, in spite of the fact that some are not robust. The war remains 
damaging to the peace and this in a robust manner. It is more or less the same report for 
the inequalities. The effects of the size of country, the religion and the diversity are not as 
clear. The human capital seems favorable. 
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Annexes 1. Nature of data 
Variables Description Sources 
EthnoLing 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization, 1985, = probability that two randomly selected 
individuals from a given country will not be from same ethnolinguistic group, 
Roeder, Philip. 2001. Ethnolinguistic fractionalization indices, 1961 and 
1985, http://weber.ucsd.edu/~proeder/elf.htm, downloaded from Quality of 
Government Database, at Quality of Government Institute, Goteborg 
University.  
Religion Percentage of people estimating that the religion is important Gallup World Poll 
Monarchy Dummy for whether the country is a monarchy CIA (2006).  
Minimum temperature Average temperature in the coldest month of the year 
World Meteorological organization; available at 
http://wmo.ch/pages/index_en.html 
Postcommunist Dummy of country has communist past 
 No Pronoun drop Dummy for whether the dominant language allows drop Kashima and Kashima (1998).  
Ethnicfrac Ethnic fractionalization Alesina et al. (2003) 
Languagefrac Linguistic fractionalization Alesina et al. (2003) 
Religionfrac Religoius fractionalization Alesina et al. (2003) 
Catholics Percent Catholic 
World Christian Database; population from Heston et al. (2002), for 
Taiwan from http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbsum.html 
Orthodox Percent Christian Orthodox 
World Christian Database; population from Heston et al. (2002), for 
Taiwan from http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbsum.html 
Muslims Percent Muslims 
World Christian Database; population from Heston et al. (2002), for 
Taiwan from http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbsum.html 
Buddhists Percent Buddhists 
World Christian Database; population from Heston et al. (2002), for 
Taiwan from http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbsum.html 
Hindus Percent Hindus 
World Christian Database; population from Heston et al. (2002), for 
Taiwan from http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbsum.html 
Jews Percent Jews 
World Christian Database; population from Heston et al. (2002), for 
Taiwan from http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbsum.html 
Protestants Percent Protestants 
World Christian Database; population from Heston et al. (2002), for 
Taiwan from http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbsum.html 
Britcol Dummy former British colony 
 Frencol Dummy former French colony.  
 Spanporc Dummy former Spanish or Portuguese colony.  
 Othercol Dummy former colony of state other than Britain, France, Spain, or Portugal 
Noncol Dummy Never a colony.  
  
 
 
Annexes 1. Nature of data (continued) 
Variables Description Source 
leg_british Dummy legal origin:  British,  
Global Development Network Growth Database, NYU, 
http://www.nyu.edu/fas/institute/dri/global%20development%20network%20growth%20database.h
tm 
leg_french Dummy legal origin:  French. Idem 
leg_socialist Dummy legal origin:  Socialist. Idem 
leg_german Dummy legal origin:  German. Idem 
leg_scandivanian Dummy legal origin:  Scandinavian Idel 
Catholics Catholics as % of population 1980  
La Porta et al. 1999. "The Quality of Government," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 
downloaded from Quality of Government Database, at Quality of Government Institute, Goteborg 
University.  
Protestants Protestants as % of population 1980 Idem 
Muslims Muslims as % of population 1980 Idem 
Life expectancy  
 
 World Bank: World Development Indictors. 
IQ National average intelligence. 
Lynn, R. and Vanhanen, T. (2006). IQ and Global Inequality. Washington Summit Publishers, 
Augusta, GA 
WAR 
Dummy for countries that participated in at least one 
external war 1960-85 
Barro and Lee: A Data Set for a Panel of 138 Countries at 
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data.html 
 
Number of armed conflicts, external and internal, in 
which the government was involved, average of years 
1995-2000. 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program, data downloaded from Quality of Government Database, at 
Quality of Government Institute, Goteborg University.   
 
Average for sum of ratings of Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program of country on: extrasystemic armed conflict, 
interstate armed conflict, internal armed conflict, and 
internationalized internal armed conflict, for years 1995-
2000. Ratings go from 0 (no conflict of this type), 1 
(minor conflict), 2 (intermediate conflict), 3(war).  
Data downloaded from Quality of Government Database, at Quality of Government Institute, 
Goteborg University.   
Inequality GINI coefficient 
UNDP, Human Development Report, 2004; downloaded from STM103 Global Indicators Shared 
Dataset, Updated Fall 2005, from http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~pnorris/Data/Data.htm  
Annexes 1. Nature of data (fin) 
Variables Description Source 
Information and 
development Television sets per 1000 inhabitants  
World Bank, downloaded from STM103 Global Indicators Shared Dataset, Updated 
Fall 2005, from http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~pnorris/Data/Data.htm 
 
Newspapers per 1000 inhabitants.  World Bank World Development Indicators 
  
nterparliamentary Union, Women in Parliament, 2000, downloaded from STM103 
Global Indicators Shared Dataset,  
Gender Percentage women in lower house of parliament, I Updated Fall 2005, from http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~pnorris/Data/Data.htm 
 
Women in government at ministerial level (as %of total) 2001  
(UNDP, Human Development Report, 2004), downloaded from STM103 Global 
Indicators Shared Dataset, Updated Fall 2005, from 
http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~pnorris/Data/Data.htm  
REVC Average number of revolutions and coups per year 1960-1984 
 Levine R. and Renelt D. A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth 
Regressions, The American Economic Review, Vol 82:4. 
Inflation 
 
FMI 
   Open Exports plus Imports divided by CGDP Penn World Tables 6.1 . 
 
Imports of goods and services as % GDP World Bank World Development Indicators 
Growth rate of terms of trade King-Levine data set at http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/ddkile93.htm 
Ratio of liquid libialities to GDP King-Levine data set at http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/ddkile93.htm 
Annual population growth Penn World Tables 6.1 . 
Log Area Country area, square kilometers Central Intelligence Agency (2004) 
Gov. consumption share of GDP King-Levine data set at http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/ddkile93.htm 
Economic growth Growth per capita Penn World Tables 6.1 . 
Democracy Institutionalized democracy score (0 - 10)   
Polity IV, downloaded from Quality of Government Database, at Quality of 
Government Institute, Goteborg University.   
Polright Political rights  Freedom House 
Civillib Civil liberties  Freedom House 
Type of economic 
organization  
Type of Economic Organization (Freedom House). Capitalist 
countries have a value of 4 or 5. 
Robert E. Hall and Charles I. Jones, "Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much 
More Output per Worker than Others?" Version 4.00 March 
Social Infrastructure  Index of social infrastructure 
Robert E. Hall and Charles I. Jones, "Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much 
More Output per Worker than Others?" Version 4.00 March 
ICRG 
Measure of Political Environment or Property Rights from the 
International Country Risk Guide 
Olsson and Hibbs: "Biogeography and long run economic development", Data 
appendix: http://www.handels.gu.se/~econdhib/DEA.pdf 
PolStab Political Stability World Bank Governance indicator 
GovEff Government Effectiveness World Bank Governance indicator 
Trust 
Share of population saying yes to the question ―In general, do 
you think that most people can be trusted?‖ Bjørnskov (2006) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
